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Time preferences and lifetime outcomes1 
by 
Bart H.H. Golsteyn2, Hans Grönqvist3 and Lena Lindahl4 
October 14, 2013 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between time preferences and lifetime social and 
economic behavior. We use a Swedish longitudinal dataset that links information from a large 
survey on children’s time preferences at age 13 to administrative registers spanning over four 
decades. Our results indicate a substantial adverse relationship between high discount rates and 
school performance, health, labor supply, and lifetime income. Males and high ability children 
gain significantly more from being future-oriented. These discrepancies are largest regarding 
outcomes later in life. We also show that the relationship between time preferences and long-run 
outcomes operates through early human capital investments. 
Keywords: Intertemporal choice; personality, preference parameter, human capital; income; 
health. 
JEL-codes: D03, D91, J01 
  
                                                 
1 We received valuable comments from Anders Björklund, Thomas Dohmen, Markus Jäntti, Matthew 
Lindquist, Anna Sjögren, Bas ter Weel, conference participants of the 2011 ESPE and the 2012 ESSLE 
meetings and seminar participants at the Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy 
(IFAU). Golsteyn thanks the Volkswagen Stiftung and Handelsbanken’s forskningsstiftelser for financial 
support; Grönqvist acknowledges funding from FAS and Handelsbanken’s forskningsstiftelser; Lindahl 
thanks FAS and IFAU for financing part of this research.  
2 Department of Economics and Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA),Maastricht 
University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, the Netherlands, and Swedish Institute for Social 
Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, 
b.golsteyn@maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
3 Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, 
hans.gronqvist@sofi.su.se. 
4 Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden, 
lena.lindahl@sofi.su.se. 
  
1 Introduction 
Every day people make decisions that involve balancing costs and benefits occurring at different 
points in time.Such choices include whether or not to drop out of school, search for a new job, 
or start saving. Intertemporal decision making has been a cornerstone in many economic models 
since Samuelson (1937), and a salient feature in human capital theory, where the notion is that 
people with high discount rates invest less in their future than people who are more future-
oriented (e.g. Mincer 1958; Becker 1964). As the full returns to many human capital 
investments are not revealed until after some time, it is remarkable that there are only few 
empirical studies which link time preferences to long-term outcomes.5 This lacuna is especially 
evident regarding investments made early in life. Needless to say, childhood represents a critical 
period when many important investments are made with potentially life-lasting consequences. 
With a small number of exceptions (e.g. Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez 1989; Cadena and Keys 
2011), the existing evidence on the connection between time preferences and real world 
outcomes is cross-sectional in nature and focuses on the adult population. 
This paper investigates the relationship between time preferences during childhood and long-
run social and economic outcomes. We use a Swedish longitudinal dataset that links survey-
based information on 11,907 children’s time preferences at age 13 to administrative registers 
spanning over four decades. Time preferences are measured through a questionnaire in which 
children are asked to rate the extent to which they prefer SEK 900 (USD 130) today over SEK 
9,000(USD 1,300) in five years.6 We document how time preferences are related to human 
capital investments in terms of educational choices and school performance as early as in 
compulsory school. We then follow the children throughout life, observing their completed 
education, results on military enlistment tests, fertility decisions, indicators of health, labor 
market success, and lifetime income.7 
Our results indicate that time preferences are strongly associated with lifetime outcomes.8 A 
higher discount rate is linked to weaker performance in both compulsory and secondary school, 
lower educational attainment, and lower scores on military achievement tests at age 19. The 
                                                 
5 We use the terms impatience, high discount rate and high rate of time preference as synonyms. 
6 In 2012 year’s price level. 
7 The literature on economic preference parameters typically focuses on the predictive value of 
preferences. Causal effects are not possible to elicit since - even in the setting of a laboratory where the 
researcher can control many aspects - it would not be possible to design an experiment which influences 
time preferences only. One cannot exclude the possibility that other preferences are influenced as well by 
the experiment. Our paper highlights the importance of the predictive value of high time preferences at a 
young age. We make a step in the direction of analyzing the robustness of our findings to important 
potential confounders by controlling for individual and parental characteristics and by analyzing within-
twin differences. 
8This result is related to the work by Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) and Heineck and Anger (2010), 
who find evidence that personality traits predict later in life outcomes. 
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magnitude of the discrepancy in compulsory school performance between more and less future-
oriented children is substantial and similar to the gender gap in performance between boys and 
girls. We also document an adverse relation with lifetime income, unemployment, welfare take-
up, early death, obesity and teenage childbearing. Our results hold even after controlling for 
potentially important confounding factors such as parental socioeconomic status and cognitive 
ability.9 In an attempt to also partly control for the influence of genes and unobserved family 
influences, we compare outcomes within twin-pairs included in our sample. We also use an 
alternative measure of time discounting obtained from a factor analysis of other questions 
included in the survey. The results from both these exercises corroborate our main findings.  
We continue by studying the association between time preferences and lifetime outcomes in 
different segments of the population. Our results show that being future-oriented is a more 
important trait for men when predicting long-run outcomes than for women. The same holds for 
individuals who scored above average on a spatial ability test included in the survey. 
Interestingly, while correlations between time preferences and earnings and disposable income 
are larger for females and low ability individuals at age 27, the correlations become larger for 
males and high ability individuals later in life.        
A key result in our paper is that the relationship between time preferences and lifetime 
outcomes is mediated by early human capital investments. There is some evidence that time 
preferences are malleable and that interventions in childhood environment may contribute in 
shaping time preferences.10 The results in our paper would in this case imply that early 
interventions that make individuals more future-oriented potentially bring lifelong benefits.  
The strength and novelty of our study lie in the use of a very rich data source. The data 
enable us to link time preferences during childhood to social and economic outcomes observed 
for a very long portion of the respondents’ lives. We measure time preferences at age 13 and are 
able to follow individuals for more than four decades. No other data have enabled researchers to 
analyze the importance of time preferences for such an extended period. An additional 
substantial benefit is that our data is taken from a large sample of Swedish citizens with little 
scope for selection into or out of the sample. The survey at age 13 had a mandatory character 
since it was conducted in schools and all pupils present at school during that particular day took 
part in the survey. The outcomes later in life are taken from administrative registers so there is 
hardly any attrition in the data. A third benefit of our data is that it allows us to control for 
results on cognitive ability tests that were part of the survey. We believe that this is important, 
                                                 
9E.g. Dohmen et al. (2010) and Burks et al. (2009) report that time preferences and cognitive ability are 
related. 
10 We discuss evidence on the malleability of time preferences in the results section.  
  
given the results in recent research that time preferences and ability interact in the adult 
population (Dohmen et al 2010; Shamosh and Gray, 2007).   
Most earlier studies on the relationship between time preferences and outcomes are cross-
sectional in nature or follow individuals over a short period of time. For instance, some studies 
have documented that time preferences in the adult population are significantly correlated with 
field outcomes such as occupational choice (Burks et al. 2009), credit card borrowing (Meier 
and Sprenger 2010b), and substance use and nutrition (Chabris et al. 2008). Recent articles by 
Sutter et al. (2011), Bettinger and Slonim (2007) and Castillo et al. (2011) focus on time 
preferences among children. Sutter et al. (2011) relate risk attitudes and time preferences to 
health-related field behavior and savings decisions in an experimental setting. They find cross-
sectional evidence that discount rates among 661 children aged 10 to 18 correlate with their 
Body Mass Index (BMI) and savings as well as spending on alcohol and tobacco. Bettinger and 
Slonim (2007) measure time preferences among approximately 200 5-16 year old children and 
find hyperbolic preferences, differences between boys and girls, and racial differences. Their 
cross-sectional evidence does not reveal a correlation with school achievement. Castillo et al. 
(2011) show that one standard deviation increase in the elicited discount rate among 880 
children aged 13 to 15 is associated with an increase in the number of disciplinary referrals in 
the following school year of 14 percent.  
Only few previous studies have been able to follow their subjects over a longer period of 
time and the focus of these investigations is on the concept of self-control. The seminal work by 
Walter Mischel and co-authors analyze the relationship between self-control and children’s 
subsequent behavior (see Mischel, Shoda and Peake, 1988, Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 
1989, and Shoda, Mischel and Peake, 1990). Their experiment measured delay of gratification 
by the time children aged four could wait for a larger treat relative to a smaller immediate treat. 
Around one decade later, the children who were able to delay their gratification for the longest 
period also scored highest on achievement tests. The sample used was very small (95 children). 
Another psychological study in the same spirit but with a somewhat larger sample size is 
performed by Moffitt et al. (2011), who at various ages attempt to measure self-control by a 
composite that among other things incorporates parental-teacher ratings of children’s 
aggression, hyperactivity, and impulsivity, with self reports of attention problems and 
observational ratings of restlessness and stamina, for a cohort of around 1,000 New-Zealand 
children. They follow the children from age 3 to 32 and find substantial positive effects of the 
composite on health, wealth and crime. Related to this, in Economics, a recent study by Cadena 
and Keys (2011) focuses on outcomes related to education and earnings using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Since the NLSY does not contain a direct 
 5 
measure of time preferences, the authors use as a proxy for time preference: the assessment of 
the interviewer whether (s)he perceived the respondent as restless. The results suggest that 
restless individuals did worse in terms of educational attainment and labor supply in young 
adulthood.11 
Besides the difference in the magnitude of the samples, the length of the period in which the 
children were followed, and the relevance and range of outcomes observed, one important 
difference between our paper and this research lies in the measurement of the trade-off between 
the present and the future. The children in the work by Mischeland co-authors attempt to control 
their current appetite while they make the trade-off between the present and the future. The 
measure therefore in essence conflates self-control and standard exponential discounting.12, 13 
The authors acknowledge this by referring to this measure as “future-oriented self-control” 
(Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989, p. 281).Since our measure entails a hypothetical 
monetary trade-off between the present and the future, there is no reason to believe that this 
measure of time preferences is related to self-control problems. It is further unclear to what 
extent factors like aggression and inattention provide an accurate representation of time 
preferences. 
The set-up of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 shows the results 
and section 4 concludes. 
2 Data 
We use data from the Stockholm Birth Cohort Study (SBC), created in 2004/2005 by means of a 
probability matching of two previously existing longitudinal data sets.14 The first is the 
Stockholm Metropolitan Study 1953-1985, which consists of all children born in 1953 who were 
living in the Stockholm metropolitan area on November 1, 1963. This data source contains a 
rich set of variables concerning individual, family, social and neighborhood characteristics. The 
second is The Swedish Work and Mortality Database, an administrative data set which includes 
                                                 
11Restlessness was measured rather late in the respondents’ lives: at age 15-27. By that age, most 
individuals already have undertaken important human capital investments, making the analysis to some 
extent susceptible to reverse causality.   
12Restlessness may also indicate self-control problems. 
13 Self-control problems may for instance arise due to visceral influences (e.g. hunger). They generate 
inconsistencies in intertemporal preferences. A model in which future utility is discounted quasi-
hyperbolically can illustrate the conceptual difference between exponential discounting and self-control 
problems (e.g. Laibson 1994, 1997). In this model, utility falls very rapidly for small delay periods (due 
to self-control problems), while it falls more slowly and regularly for longer delay periods. Both the 
extent to which people consistently prefer the present relative to the future (delta) and the extent to which 
they face self-control problems (beta) may be of importance for future outcomes.  
14 See Stenberg and Vågerö (2006) for a full description of the dataset and the matching procedure. 
Codebooks are available online: http://www.stockholmbirthcohort.su.se/about-the-project/original-data-
1953-1983. 
  
information on education, income, work, unemployment and mortality for all individuals living 
in Sweden in 1980 or 1990 who were born before 1985. The database contains information on 
the individuals up to 2001. 
The SBC study includes survey data from a school study that was conducted in 1966 when 
the cohort members were 13 years old. During one school day, pupils at practically all schools 
in the county filled out two questionnaires, including the question which we use to elicit time 
preferences, and took a spatial cognitive ability test which we use to measure cognitive ability. 
An important aspect of the survey is that it took place at school which gave it a mandatory 
character. As a result, the non-response rate is only 9 percent (the percentage of pupils absent on 
that particular school day). The low non-response rate in combination with the fact that the 
survey was given to all students in the county is likely to increase the external validity of our 
study.15 A concern with laboratory based studies is that the participants may be self-selected on 
the basis of their discount rate. Impatient individuals could for example be less likely to sign up 
for participation in a laboratory experiment.16 On the other hand, as in many other studies we 
rely on a hypothetical question about individual time preferences and it is not obvious that 
stated choices perfectly correspond to actual ones.       
We measure time preferences using the following question: “If you had to choose between 
SEK 900 [USD 130] now versus SEK 9,000 [USD 1,300] in five years, which would you 
choose?”17 The set of possible answers was: “Certainly SEK 900 now” (1), “Probably SEK 900 
now” (2), “Cannot choose” (3), “Probably SEK 9000 in five years” (4), “Certainly SEK 9000 in 
five years” (5). In our regressions we treat the answers as flexible as possible and include 
dummies for the different categories. To simplify the presentation of the results, we also use a 
single dummy set to unity if the answer belonged to categories 4 or 5 and zero otherwise.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the answers. In spite of the very high implied annual 
discount rate of 58%, 13% of the children state that they prefer SEK 900 (USD 130) today over 
SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years. The discount rate is well in line with discount rates used in 
                                                 
15Given the nature of our data it is relevant to ask whether our results can be generalized to other contexts. 
First, we can note that at the time when the data were collected, the Stockholm metropolitan area covered 
about one fourth of the Swedish population, so quite a large part of the population is covered. Secondly, 
Lindahl (2011) compares summary statistics for both the SBC data and a nationally representative sample 
also born in 1953 and finds, as expected, similar income averages and variances in the SBC data. Her 
estimates are also very similar to those found in Norwegian studies based on nationally representative 
samples. This suggest that our sample should at the very least be representative for the Swedish 
population.   
16Related to this, von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengström (2011) find that people in a laboratory have 
substantially lower risk preferences than subjects drawn from the (Dutch) population and that the 
heterogeneity among subjects in the laboratory is much lower than that in the population wide sample. 
However they also show that self-selection into the experiments did much less harm than sampling from a 
narrowly defined distribution, such as a student population.  
17Note that these amounts are presented in current prices.   
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other experimental and field studies (see e.g. Frederick et al. 2002). Bettinger and Slonim 
(2007) report that one third of their sample of children turned down a 150 percent return in two 
months in favor of immediately receiving compensation.  
Our data contain many outcomes that are expected to be related to human capital 
investments. Human capital theory posits that people with high discount rates invest less in 
education than people who prefer to delay their rewards (e.g. Mincer 1958, Becker, 1964). We 
observe grades in compulsory school and high school and the highest level completed with a 
diploma (e.g. high school, college). The grade point averages are taken from local school 
registers in grade nine in compulsory school and in the last year of upper secondary school.18 
We also observe achievement test scores at military enlistment (at age 19), calculated as an 
average of four sub-tests including rapid comprehension, inductive ability, verbal 
comprehension and spatial ability. Such enlistment test scores are often interpreted as measures 
of cognitive ability but may also be described as achievement test scores: a reflection of 
acquired knowledge (Borghans et al., 2012). Scores on achievement tests are related to 
cognitive ability but also associated with personality traits (Borghans et al., 2012; Segal, 2012). 
Next to this, we analyze the link between discounting and educational attainment as well as the 
choice of whether or not to enroll in science track in high school.  
Our next set of outcomes relates to long-run labor market performance. Time preferences 
may not only be related to human capital investments but could also predict labor supply 
decisions. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) show that impatient individuals accept a lower 
reservation wage, but stay unemployed longer than patient individuals. Data on long-run labor 
market outcomes are collected from several sources. We use the 1980 Census to collect 
information on earnings and disposable income at age 27. Administrative registers available 
between the years 1990 to 2001 are used to examine earnings and disposable income at age 37 
and 47 respectively. We also proxy long-run income by averaging incomes between ages 37 and 
48 years (see e.g. Haider and Solon; Böhlmark and Lindquist 2006).For the same period we 
calculate the average annual number of unemployment days per year and the share of years 
receiving welfare.   
We also study the relationship between time preferences and health. Grossman (1972) posits 
that an individual’s discount rate is adversely related to health investments so that individuals 
who are less future-oriented invest less in their health. There is cross-sectional evidence on this 
relationship but no longitudinal evidence. Fuchs (1982) found weak relationships between time 
preferences and smoking. Bickel, Odum and Madden (1999) find that people with high time 
                                                 
18In the 1960s, grades were on a scale of 1-5 and relative to the performance of other students. The 
population grade distribution was assumed to be normal, which generates a national average for each 
cohort of 3.0. 
  
preferences are more likely to be smoking. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) show that high time 
discounters have a higher BMI. We analyze whether time preferences are related to obesity 
(BMI>30) at military enlistment and early death (by age 50). 
The original SBC data set matched with administrative registers consists of 13,606 
observations. After selecting out observations with missing values on the time preferences 
variable, our data contains 11,907 observations. Table A 1 gives the descriptive statistics of the 
variables included in our analysis.  
Before proceeding to our results it is useful to illustrate the correlation between time 
preferences and various individual characteristics. Table A 2 provides least squares estimates 
where the dependent variable is a dummy set to unity if the child with certainty or almost 
certainty prefers to delay his/her rewards and zero otherwise. We can see that ability and gender 
are strongly correlated with time preferences. A one standard deviation higher ability at age 13 
is related with 2.3 percentage points (or approximately 5%) higher likelihood of being patient. 
Women are 2.4 percentage points less likely to have preferences for delaying the timing of their 
rewards. Considering the particular age at which time preferences are measured, (age 13), it 
could be the case that this difference has some connection to puberty. Girls of this age have, on 
average, gone longer in the process of puberty than boys. The finding of more impatient girls is 
in line with the findings in Dohmen et al. (2010).19 Due to the young age and potential variation 
in maturity among the children in the sample, it might be important to examine the correlation 
between time preferences and the age of the child. If time preferences are affected by a child’s 
maturity, it could be the case that December-born children are more impatient than children 
born in January. This is potentially important also since it is well known that children who are 
born earlier during the year tend to outperform those born later (see e.g. Bound et al. 1995). As 
shown in Table A 2, this is not supported by our data.  
Additionally, we investigate the role of parental socio-economic status for their children’s 
time preferences. Parental income was taken from the official tax register in 1963, i.e. prior to 
the survey. We find a significant association between parental socioeconomic status and time 
preferences. Children to parents with higher education tend to be more future-oriented. The 
relationship between parental income and time preferences is ambiguous: a positive association 
for fathers’ income and a negative one for mothers’ income. Not only does this finding stress 
the need to control for parental socioeconomic status in the regressions but it is also suggestive 
evidence that time preferences may be malleable.  
                                                 
19Jamison, Karland and Zinman (2012) report that there is no clear consensus on whether time 
preferences differ between men and women but the preponderance of evidence suggests that women have 
lower discount rates than men (see e.g. Castillio et al., 2011 and Bettinger and Slonim, 2007).  
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3 Results 
This section presents the results of our analysis of the link between time preferences and 
lifetime outcomes. We start by examining early measures of human capital. Then we proceed to 
investigating the relationship between time preferences and long-run labor market outcomes and 
health.  
Our main analysis includes two sets of estimates. The first uses dummies for all categories of 
the question on time preferences. The reference group here is individuals who with certainty 
prefer the immediate reward, i.e. impatient persons. The second specification pools different 
categories of the time preferences variable into a dummy that equals one if the individual with 
certainty or almost certainty prefers to delay the timing of reward and zero otherwise. In order 
to conserve space we use this single dummy variable when performing robustness checks and 
subgroup analyses. All regressions control for month of birth, gender, the educational level of 
the parent with the highest education (three levels), each parent’s income (linearly) and each 
parent’s year of birth (linearly). We only present estimates for our main variable of interest. The 
estimates of the control variables can be found in the appendix.  
Table 1 reveals that a low discount rate is an important trait for a successful school career. 
People who were more patient at age 13 achieved higher grades in compulsory school and in 
upper secondary school. Next to this, they more often enrolled in the science track in upper 
secondary school. Patience also correlates positively with the likelihood of attaining an upper 
secondary school or university diploma.  
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is sizable. We find that individuals who prefer to 
delay their reward have 0.21 standard deviations higher GPA in compulsory school and 0.20 
standard deviations higher GPA in upper secondary school. There are also indications of a 
“dose-response” relationship between the outcomes and the different answer categories. 
Individuals who are completely certain that they want to delay the timing of reward tend to have 
better outcomes than those who probably want to delay the reward. We can also see that 
individuals who delay their reward are 5.9 percentage points (or about 30 percent) more likely 
to attend the science track in upper secondary school.20  Patience also increases the probability 
to attain an upper secondary school diploma with approximately 8.5 percentage points and the 
likelihood to complete college with 5.3 percentage points. Table 1 additionally shows that 
patient boys achieve 0.21 standard deviation higher scores on the military enlistment 
achievement test.  
                                                 
20 Note that since impatience is related to attaining a high school diploma, the relationship between 
impatience and high school GPA is likely to be underestimated. 
  
The relationship between time preferences and human capital appears to be strongest among 
individuals who were absolutely certain that they would choose the immediate reward. This can 
be seen by examining the individual coefficients on the multiple dummies. From these it is clear 
that there is a large difference in the outcomes between the reference group and children who 
responded that they probably would choose the immediate reward. Even though the magnitude 
of the coefficient increases in the degree of certainty in which an individual would choose the 
delayed reward over the immediate reward, the jump is largest between children that would 
certainly compared to probably prefer the immediate reward. 
After having documented a link between time preferences and early measures of human 
capital we proceed to looking at long-run income in Table 2. In this analysis we focus on 
earnings and disposable income. We observe these outcomes at three points during the life span: 
at the ages of 27, 37 and 47. We also use average annual income between the age of 37 and 48. 
Time preferences are strongly associated with earnings and income at all periods in life. Again 
we find that the coefficients are sizable and almost always statistically significant. Being more 
patient is related to substantially higher earnings and disposable income. For example, at the age 
of 27, individuals who answered that they certainly preferred to delay the timing of reward have 
about 6.4 percent higher income than those who were certain that they wanted the immediate 
reward. Interestingly, the connection between patience and earnings seem to grow stronger later 
in life. At age 37, the corresponding figure is 7.4 percent and at age 47 it is 11.0 percent. The 
same pattern also holds for disposable income. One explanation of this result is that income at 
younger ages is a more noisy measure of lifetime income. If so, our results show that it is 
crucial to have information on income over an extended period in order to correctly assess the 
relationship between time preferences and an individual’s true earnings capacity. Note that the 
size of the estimates for disposable income is slightly lower than for earnings. One reason for 
this result may be that disposable income includes government transfers which are likely to be 
less strongly correlated with an individual’s time preferences. 
 
  
Table 1. Time preferences and educational achievement 
 Compulsory 
school GPA 
(standardized) 
Upp. sec. school 
GPA  
(standardized) 
Completed upp. 
sec. school 
Completed 
college 
Enrolled in 
science track in 
upp. sec. school 
Enlistment test 
scores 
(standardized) 
A.        
Timing of reward:        
Certainly immediate Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Probably immediate 0.281*** 0.141* 0.107*** 0.040** -0.025 0.227*** 
 (0.049) (0.082) (0.024) (0.016) (0.030) (0.076) 
Indifferent 0.194*** 0.115 0.072*** 0.025* 0.022 0.084 
 (0.046) (0.080) (0.022) (0.014) (0.031) (0.071) 
Probably delay  0.372*** 0.276*** 0.144*** 0.072*** 0.039 0.338*** 
 (0.039) (0.069) (0.018) (0.012) (0.026) (0.057) 
Certainly delay  0.383*** 0.316*** 0.154*** 0.086*** 0.051** 0.337*** 
 (0.038) 
 
(0.069) (0.018) (0.012) (0.026) (0.055) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.113 0.085 0.120 0.119 0.068 0.055 
Timing of reward:       
Immediate or indifferent  Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay 0.210*** 0.196*** 0.085*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.214*** 
 (0.027) 
 
(0.042) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.041) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.108 0.082 0.117 0.117 0.067 0.049 
Observations 11,120 5,649 11,907 11,907 5,649 6,047 
Notes: The table shows the coefficients on dummies set to unity if the child at age 13 probably prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five 
years, is indifferent, or either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years. All regressions are estimated by OLS. Each column represents a separate 
regression. The sample consists of children born in Stockholm county in 1953. All regressions control for dummies for month of birth, gender, educational level (3 
levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income (linearly) and each parent’s year of birth (linearly). *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = 
significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
  
Table 2. Time preferences and income over life 
 log(Earnings) log(Disposable income) 
 Age 27 Age 37 Age 47 Long-term 
income 
Age 27 Age 37 Age 47 Long-term 
income 
A.         
Timing of reward:         
Certainly immediate Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Probably immediate 0.042 0.047 0.097** 0.074 0.024 0.065** 0.091*** 0.054** 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.023) 
Indifferent 0.078** 0.073** 0.097** 0.054 0.056 0.049* 0.074** 0.033 
 (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.043) (0.036) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022) 
Probably delay 0.076** 0.061** 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.064** 0.075*** 0.099*** 0.078*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.022) (0.025) (0.018) 
Certainly delay 0.064* 0.074*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.054* 0.082*** 0.112*** 0.078*** 
 (0.033) 
 
(0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.056 0.093 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.046 0.049 0.063 
Immediate or indifferent Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay 0.049** 0.044** 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.046** 0.042*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 
 (0.023) 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.055 0.093 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.045 0.048 0.062 
Observations 11,537 11,032 10,392 11,456 11,648 11,556 11,252 11,193 
Notes: The table shows the coefficients on dummies set to unity if the child at age 13 probably prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five 
years, is indifferent, or either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years. All regressions are estimated by OLS. Each column represents a separate 
regression. The sample consists of children born in Stockholm county in 1953. All regressions control for dummies for month of birth, gender, educational level (3 
levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income (linearly) and each parent’s year of birth (linearly). Long-term income is calculated as average 
over age 37-48.  *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
Table 3 displays results for other dependent variables related to labor supply, health and 
fertility. We can see that patience significantly predicts less use of welfare and fewer days on 
unemployment between the ages of 37 and 48. Children who at age 13 preferred to delay the 
timing of reward had for instance 1.6 fewer unemployment days per year at middle age. In 
relation to the mean of the dependent variable this translates into a reduction of about 15 
percent.  
Time preferences are also significantly related to health outcomes. In Table 3 we see that 
patient men are 1.5 percentage points less likely to be classified as obese at military enlistment. 
Patient respondents are also 0.9 percentage points less likely to die before age 50. Our findings 
for obesity are in line with the results in Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) who study the 
relationship between time preferences and the BMI among adults. As discussed by Borghans 
and Golsteyn, one reason may be that impatient people may value candy, fast food and other 
instant satisfiers more than patient people. 
Table 3. The link between time preferences and welfare, unemployment, obesity, death and teenage 
pregnancy 
 Share of 
years on 
welfare 
Annual 
unemploy-
ment days 
Obese at 
enlistment Early death Teenage mother
A. Timing of reward:      
      
Certainly immediate Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Probably immediate -0.016* -0.123 -0.030** -0.012 -0.033** 
 (0.009) (1.772) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) 
Indifferent -0.007 -1.119 -0.023* -0.013 -0.026* 
 (0.009) (1.598) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) 
Probably delay -0.026*** -2.418* -0.030*** -0.019** -0.033** 
 (0.007) (1.383) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
Certainly delay -0.020*** -1.256 -0.034*** -0.013* -0.027** 
 (0.007) (1.384) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.023 0.006 0.796 0.006 0.014 
B. Timing of reward:      
Immediate or indifferent Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay -0.013*** -1.654* -0.015** -0.009* -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.944) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.021 0.006 0.796 0.005 0.012 
Observations 11,696 11,657 11,907 11,907 5,860 
Notes: The table shows the coefficients on dummies set to unity if the child at age 13 probably prefers 
SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years, is indifferent, or either probably or 
certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years. All regressions control for dummies for month of birth, gender, 
educational level (3 levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income (linearly) and 
each parent’s year of birth (linearly). The dependent variables Share of years on welfare and Annual 
unemployment days are calculated as the average over age 37-48. *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = 
significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
  
3.1 Sensitivity analyses 
We next set out to examine the robustness of our results to changes in the specification of the 
regressions or the way we measure time preferences. The results are shown in Table 4. We first 
investigate how sensitive our results are to dropping controls for parental background. As 
already mentioned, children’s answers to the survey could reflect parental socioeconomic status. 
If this is the case we would expect our estimates to change when not controlling for parental 
education and income. As can be seen in Table 4, the coefficients indeed become larger (in 
absolute terms) when excluding these controls. However, the change is small, which suggests 
that failure to control for parental socioeconomic status does not bias the estimates in a 
meaningful way. 
In an attempt to further control for potential confounders we take advantage of the fact that 
our data contain information on twins who we can identify and link to their parents. We 
estimate within-twin fixed effect models that control for all factors shared by the twins 
(regardless whether these are environmental of genetic). Since there are only 117 pairs of twins 
in the data our estimates naturally become imprecise and almost none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. The point estimates however reveal that in many cases both the sign and 
the magnitude of the coefficients are similar to those in our full sample.  
As a final robustness check we use the principal component of answers on a battery of other 
questions included in the survey which are plausibly linked to time preferences. The questions 
can be found in the appendix. To facilitate interpretation of the results we choose to standardize 
the factor variable to have mean zero and unit standard deviation. Looking at Table 4 we see 
that using this alternative measure of time preferences does not change our conclusions: 
increased patience still predicts more favorable outcomes throughout life. 
  
  
Table 4. Robustness checks 
 Baseline No control 
for parental 
background 
Within-
twin 
analysis 
Measuring time 
preferences 
using 
standardized 
factor variable  
Dependent variable:      
Compulsory school GPA (Std.) 0.210*** 
(0.027) 
0.250*** 
(0.028) 
-0.072 
(0.180) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
Upper sec. school GPA (Std.)  0.196*** 
(0.042) 
0.209*** 
(0.042) 
0.254 
(0.332) 
0.027** 
(0.014) 
Completed upper sec. school 
 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.105*** 
(0.014) 
0.086 
(0.095) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Completed college 
 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.009) 
0.073 
(0.077) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Science track in upper sec. school  
 
0.059*** 
(0.016) 
0.066*** 
(0.016) 
N/A -0.005 
(0.006) 
Enlistment test (Std.) 0.214*** 
(0.041) 
0.242*** 
(0.041) 
N/A -0.004 
(0.013) 
Log(earnings) age 27  0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.048*** 
(0.023) 
0.284 
(0.167) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
Log(earnings) age 37 
 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.051*** 
(0.020) 
-0.096 
(0.145) 
0.016*** 
(0.007) 
Log(earnings) age 47 
 
0.060*** 
(0.023) 
0.071*** 
(0.023) 
0.085 
(0.214) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
Log(long-run earnings)  
  
0.071*** 
(0.024) 
0.083*** 
(0.024) 
0.266 
(0.253) 
0.022*** 
(0.009) 
Log(disp. income) age 27  
 
0.046*** 
(0.021) 
0.047*** 
(0.021) 
0.271 
(0.203) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Log(disp. income) age 37 
 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.048*** 
(0.015) 
0.064 
(0.137) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Log(disp. income) age 47 
 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
0.068*** 
(0.017) 
-0.046 
(0.112) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Log(long-run disp. income)  
  
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
0.111 
(0.088) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
Annual days unemployed -1.654* 
(0.944) 
-1.873** 
(0.942) 
-8.719 
(11.96) 
-0.232 
(0.009) 
Share of years on welfare  -0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.068* 
(0.041) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Obese at enlistment (males only)  -0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.015*** 
(0.006) 
N/A 0.002 
(0.002) 
Early death  -0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.016) 
N/A -0.001 
(0.002) 
Teenage mother  -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.012* 
(0.008) 
N/A -0.003 
(0.002) 
Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient of the time preference dummy variable (0 if the child at age 13 
probably or certainly prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years, or is 
indifferent, and 1 if it either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years) from a separate 
regression where the dependent variable is given in the left column. The sample consists of children born 
in Stockholm county in 1953. Regressions in column 1, 2 and 4 are estimated by OLS, while column 3 
presents fixed effect estimates. All regressions except those in column 2 control for dummies for month 
of birth, gender, educational level (3 levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s 
income (linearly) and each parent’s year of birth (linearly). Long-term income is calculated as average 
over age 37-48.  *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 
% level. 
  
  
3.2 Extensions of the analysis 
Having established that our results are robust to changes in the empirical specification and how 
we measure time preferences, we continue by analyzing whether the link between time 
preferences and lifetime outcomes differs for various segments of the population. An interesting 
question is whether the relationships differ between men and women or between people with 
high and low cognitive ability. An important stream of literature indicates large gaps between 
women and men with respect to education and later in life outcomes, such as wages. Likewise, 
scores on IQ tests have often been shown to be highly predictive of such future outcomes. The 
question we can analyze with our data is how patience affects such outcomes for men, women, 
high and low ability children. Information about the elasticities of patience and the outcomes for 
these subgroups can give a first indication of the potential effectiveness of investments in 
patience to alleviate the gaps. We analyze this by running separate regressions for these groups. 
Our results are presented in Table 5.  
Men appear to benefit more from being patient than women. Both when it comes to early 
human capital investments and long-run income, being future-oriented is a more important trait 
for men than for women. For long-run earnings the difference is substantial: while patient males 
have 12.1 percent higher long-run earnings, the corresponding estimate for women is only 2.8 
percent (and not statistically significant). We also find that children who scored above average 
on the spatial ability test taken at age 13 benefit more from being patient than children with 
below average ability. 
Although the gap is present already in school it is strongest for long-run income and health. 
  
  
Table 5. Subgroup analysis 
 Baseline Men Women Low ability High ability 
Compulsory school GPA 
(Std.) 
0.210*** 
(0.027) 
0.264*** 
(0.041) 
0.167*** 
(0.035) 
0.157*** 
(0.036) 
0.201*** 
(0.036) 
Upper sec. school GPA 
(Std.)  
0.196*** 
(0.042) 
0.197*** 
(0.065) 
0.187*** 
(0.054) 
0.168*** 
(0.065) 
0.199*** 
(0.054) 
Completed upper sec. 
school 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.084*** 
(0.019) 
0.087*** 
(0.018) 
0.075*** 
(0.017) 
0.07*** 
(0.019) 
Completed college 
 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.06*** 
(0.015) 
Science track in upper 
sec. school  
0.059*** 
(0.016) 
0.112*** 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
0.023*** 
(0.02) 
0.071*** 
(0.022) 
Enlistment test (Std.) 0.214*** 
(0.041) 
N/A N/A 0.151*** 
(0.05) 
0.177*** 
(0.058) 
Log(earnings) age 27  0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
0.086*** 
(0.037) 
0.052* 
(0.031) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
Log(earnings) age 37 
 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.063*** 
(0.03) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
0.025 
(0.028) 
0.056** 
(0.029) 
Log(earnings) age 47 
 
0.060*** 
(0.023) 
0.076*** 
(0.033) 
0.046 
(0.032) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
0.076*** 
(0.031) 
Log(long-run earnings) 
  
0.071*** 
(0.024) 
0.121*** 
(0.041) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
0.006* 
(0.034) 
0.116*** 
(0.035) 
Log(disp. income) age 
27  
0.046*** 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.024) 
0.08*** 
(0.034) 
0.064* 
(0.03) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
Log(disp. income) age 
37 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
0.036** 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
0.051*** 
(0.021) 
Log(disp. income) age 
47 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
0.103*** 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
0.056*** 
(0.017) 
Log(long-run disp. 
income)   
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.025* 
(0.019) 
0.03* 
(0.018) 
0.066*** 
(0.024) 
Annual days unemployed -1.654* 
(0.944) 
-2.647* 
(1.504) 
-0.753 
(1.186) 
-0.232 
(1.328) 
-2.898*** 
(1.355) 
Share of years on welfare  -0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.008) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(0.006) 
Obese at enlistment 
(males only)  
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
N/A N/A -0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.026*** 
(0.01) 
Early death  -0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Teenage mother  -0.011 
(0.008) 
N/A N/A -0.01 
(0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient of the time preferences dummy variable (0 if the child at age 13 
probably or certainly prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years, or is 
indifferent, and 1 if it either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years) from a separate 
regression where the dependent variable is given in the left column. The sample consists of children born 
in Stockholm county in 1953. All regressions are estimated by OLS and control for dummies for month of 
birth, gender, educational level (3 levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income 
(linearly) and each parent’s year of birth (linearly). Long-term income is calculated as average over age 
37-48. Low ability is defined as individuals who scored below average on the spatial ability test at age 13. 
*** = significant at the 1 % level ** = significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
  
3.3 Early human capital as a mediator 
So far we have shown that time preferences are associated with both human capital investments 
and long-run labor market and health. As early human capital investments are strongly linked to 
labor market performance, it is interesting to ask to what extent the relationship between time 
preferences and long-run outcomes operates through human capital. To investigate this we ran 
regressions where we controlled for educational attainment as well as our measure of spatial 
ability at age 13. Our results, presented in Table 6 and Table 7, reveal that controlling for spatial 
ability does not affect our estimates of the long-run relationship in any meaningful way. 
However, when including controls for educational attainment the point estimates fall 
substantially. Most of the estimates are no longer statistically significant and many are also 
close to zero. This is true both when it comes to earnings and income and also for our other 
measures of labor supply and health. 
From this evidence, we conclude that (1) the relationship between time preferences and 
outcomes does not seem to be driven by intelligence and (2) that the association between time 
preferences and lifetime outcomes seems to be explained by the positive relationship between 
time preferences and educational attainment. The latter result is potentially important in the 
sense that if time preferences are malleable and to some degree truly affect the outcomes, our 
results imply that early interventions that make individuals more future-oriented potentially can 
bring life lasting benefits. 
 
  
Table 6. Time preferences and income over life: with and without controlling for ability and educational attainment 
 log(Earnings) log(Disposable income) 
 Age 27 Age 37 Age 47 Long-term 
income 
 
Age 27 Age 37 Age 47 Long-term 
income 
A. Baseline (as in Table 2) 
Timing of reward:         
Immediate or indifferent Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay 0.049** 0.044** 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.046** 0.042*** 0.056*** 0.045*** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.055 0.093 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.045 0.048 0.062 
Observations 11,537 11,032 10,392 11,456 11,648 11,556 11,252 11,193 
B. Controlling for ability at age 13 
Immediate or indifferent Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay 0.046** 0.036* 0.044* 0.051** 0.042** 0.034** 0.042** 0.034*** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) 
Ability Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.056 0.097 0.062 0.065 0.054 0.051 0.058 0.074 
Observations 11,535 11,030 10,390 11,454 11,646 11,554 11,250 11,191 
C. Controlling for educational attainment 
Immediate or indifferent Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay 0.039* 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.038* 0.019 0.015 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) 
Educ. attainment Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Ability Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.063 0.131 0.122 0.134 0.062 0.080 0.124 0.147 
Observations 11,330 11,030 10,362 11,413 11,431 11,554 11,214 11,191 
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the time preferences dummy variable (0 if the child at age 13 probably or certainly prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus 
SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years, or is indifferent, and 1 if it either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years). All regressions incl dummies for month of 
birth, gender educational level (3 levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income (linearly) and each parent’s year of birth (linearly). Long-term 
income is calculated as average over age 37-48.*** = sign.at 1 % level ** = sign. at 5 % level* = sign at 10 % level. 
  
Table 7. The link between time preferences and welfare, unemployment, obesity, death and teenage 
pregnancy with and without controlling for ability and educational attainment 
 Share of  
years on 
welfare 
Annual 
unemploy 
ment days 
Obese at 
enlistment 
Early death Teenage 
mother 
A. Baseline (as in Table 3) 
Timing of reward:      
Immediate/indifferent Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay -0.013*** -1.654* -0.015** -0.009* -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.944) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.021 0.006 0.796 0.005 0.012 
Observations 11,696 11,657 11,907 11,907 5,860 
B. Controlling for ability at age 13 
Immediate/indifferent Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay -0.009* -1.312 -0.014** -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.951) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ability Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.036 0.009 0.796 0.007 0.015 
Observations 11,694 11,655 11,905 11,905 5,860 
C. Controlling for educational attainment 
Immediate/indifferent Ref. 
 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Delay -0.004 -0.504 -0.012* -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.945) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Educ. attainment Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Ability Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
Full set of controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
R-squared 0.077 0.029 0.801 0.010 0.025 
Observations 11,643 11,605 11,643 11,643 5,729 
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the time preferences dummy variable (0 if the child at age 13 
probably or certainly prefers SEK 900 (USD 130) today versus SEK 9,000 (USD 130) in five years, or is 
indifferent, and 1 if it either probably or certainly prefers SEK 9,000 in five years). Each column 
represents a separate regression. All regressions are estimated by OLS The sample consists of children 
born in Stockholm county in 1953. All regressions control with dummies for month of birth, gender 
educational level (3 levels) of the parent with the highest education, each parent’s income (linearly) and 
each parent’s year of birth (linearly). The dependent variables Share of years on welfare and Annual 
unemployment days are calculated as the average over age 37-48.  *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = 
significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
  
In an influential study, Becker and Mulligan (1997) posit that people could learn to be more 
future-oriented. However, the evidence on the malleability of time preferences is mixed. Perez-
Arce (2011) demonstrates empirically that college students in Mexico who were randomly 
admitted from a pool of applicants were more patient than individuals in the control group, 
which indicates that education has an impact on time preferences. Other studies show that 
exogenous events govern individual time preferences. Voors et al. (2012) use a field experiment 
in Burundi to examine the consequences of exposure to conflict on time preferences. The results 
suggest that individuals who are plausibly exogenously exposed to violence have higher 
discount rates. Cullen (2011) shows estimates that Sri Lankan workers who were exposed to the 
2005 tsunami exhibited more patience than those who happened to work just above the water 
mark and therefore were unaffected. Further, Bishai (2004) shows that time preferences rates 
tend to change substantially after age 29. Krupka and Stephens Jr. (2012) report that elicited 
discount rates appear to reflect market interest rates rather than individuals’ time preferences, 
and discount rates are therefore malleable. Meier and Sprenger (2010a) find no indications for 
changes in the aggregate distributions of discount factors following approximately 1,400 
individuals over a period of 2 years. The authors show that the observed one-year correlations in 
discount factors are low compared to the temporal correlation of “Big Five”, but not compared 
to typical results based on single measures. Borghans et al. (2008) review the evidence of a 
number of cross-sectional studies which report that time preferences differ across age. Recent 
research has also suggested that active decision making and optimal default choices can 
potentially moderate high discount rates (e.g. Carroll et al. 2009). Time preferences therefore 
appear to be more malleable than for instance intelligence. This result has also been documented 
for personality traits. A large body of psychological research has stressed that personality traits 
may be influenced by the environment during childhood and that they do not stabilize until late 
during adolescence (e.g. Borghans et al. 2008). 
4 Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the relationship between time preferences and outcomes later in life. Early 
theoretical contributions posit that people with high discount rates invest less in their future than 
people who are more future-oriented. This motivates the question whether time preferences 
indeed play an important role in predicting important economic outcomes later in life. Using 
unique longitudinal data spanning over four decades, we find evidence that impatience is related 
especially to less educational attainment and to weaker performance in both compulsory and 
secondary school. The main contribution of the paper is that our analysis provides new evidence 
to a remarkably small literature on the role of time preferences when young for later in life 
  
outcomes. We show that high discount rates are related to lower incomes at middle age, more 
days in unemployment, higher risk of obesity and teen-age motherhood. The results are robust 
when controlling for important confounding factors such as parental income and education and 
cognitive ability of the child. Concerning the results on income, time preferences are strongly 
associated with income throughout all periods in life and the coefficients are sizable and almost 
always statistically significant. Both regarding early human capital investments and long-run 
income, patient males have better outcomes than patient females. The same holds for 
individuals who scored above average on a spatial ability test taken at age 13. We also find that 
the relationship between time preferences and lifetime outcomes appears to be mediated by 
early human capital investments.  
To the extent that our estimates capture causal effects, our analysis, in combination with 
earlier evidence that time preferences are malleable, motivates a policy discussion about 
reducing time preferences rates. It indicates that the returns of such interventions are potentially 
high. More research is needed to corroborate our findings, especially data with other measures 
of time preferences would be an important complement to our analysis. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Standard deviation 
  
Outcome measures:   
Compulsory school GPA (scale 1-5) 3.180 0.770 
Upper secondary school GPA (scale 1-5) 3.340 0.650 
Completed upper secondary school 0.503 0.500 
Completed college 0.189 0.391 
Enrolled in science track in upper sec. school 0.215 0.411 
Military enlistment test score (scale 1-9) 5.180 2.490 
log(earnings) at age 27   6.186 0.802 
log(earnings) at age 37   12.121 0.707 
log(earnings) at age 47   12.360 0.820 
log(long-term earnings)  12.094 0.901 
log(disposable income) at age 27   10.785 0.785 
log(disposable income) at age 37   11.646 0.526 
log(disposable income) at age 47   12.075 0.667 
log(long-term disposable income)    11.942 0.501 
Average annual days unemployed 13.336 32.582 
Share of years on welfare 0.060 0.162 
Obese at enlistment (males only) 0.055 0.050 
Early death (deceased by age 50) 0.027 0.163 
Teenage mother (first birth <age 20) 0.026 0.158 
  
Control variables:   
Female 0.492 0.500 
Income father (SEK) 23133 20439 
Income mother (SEK) 4289 6457 
Age father at birth 31.168 6.491 
Age mother at birth  28.375 5.777 
IQ at age 13 22.742 7.124 
Achievement test scores at age 13 68.437 17.965 
Education of parent with highest level of education    
Compulsory school 0.746 0.435 
Upper secondary school 0.167 0.373 
College 0.087 0.282 
  
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for variables included in the analysis. The sample consists of 
all children born in Stockholm county in 1953 (N=11,907). 
  
  
Table A 2. The relationship between time preferences and individual characteristics 
 (1) (2) 
   
Female  -0.028*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Education of highest educated parent    
Upper secondary school  0.020** 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
College 0.028** 0.019* 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Income father (standardized) 0.008*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Income mother (standardized) -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age father  0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age mother  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Born February -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born March -0.031** -0.031** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born April  -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Born May 0.001 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Born June -0.002 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Born July -0.024 -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born August -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born September -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born October -0.003 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born November -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Born December -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Ability (standardized)  0.023*** 
  (0.003) 
   
Observations 11,907 11,907 
Notes: The table shows the OLS coefficients on variables used as controls in the empirical analysis. 
Dependent variable=1 if the respondent certainly or probably prefers to delay reward and zero otherwise    
The sample consists of children born in Stockholm county in 1953. *** = significant at the 1 % level ** = 
significant at the 5 % level* = significant at the 10 % level. 
  
  
Figure 1. Distribution of time preferences 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the distribution of answers to the question: “If you had to choose between SEK 
900 [USD 130] now versus SEK 9,000 [USD 1,300] in five years, which would you choose?”. Categories 
(1) to (5) represents respondents stating: “Certainly SEK 900 now” (1), “Probably SEK 900 now” (2), 
“Cannot choose” (3), “Probably SEK 9,000 in five years” (4), “Certainly SEK 9,000 in five years” (5). 
The sample consists of all children born in Stockholm county in the year 1953. The survey was 
administrated in to children aged 13. The number of respondents is 11,907.   
 
Questions used in factor analysis  
The questions which are answered in the same survey that contains our preferred measure of 
time preferences read:  
1. If school were completely voluntary and you could quit tomorrow or stay if you wanted 
to, what would you do if you could decide yourself? 
2. Do you think about how things are going to be for you when you are grown up? 
3. Do you think it is important what you are when you grow up or does it not matter? 
4. Do you compare your future prospects with other’s? 
5. Do you like thinking about what you will do when you are grown up? 
We elicited the principal component of these questions. Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of internal 
consistency is 0.53 which indicates that the internal consistency of the measure is acceptable but 
not very high and that the results of the robustness analysis should be read with some caution.  
Although the Eigenvalue of the factor analysis indicates that only one factor could be 
elicited, it appears that question 1 and 3 pick up a different factor than 2, 4 and 5. Question 1 
correlates highly with question 3 (0.240) but not much with the other questions. Question 2, 4 
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and 5 show high correlations (2 and 4: 0.276; 2 and 5: 0.449; 4 and 5: 0.239). It seems therefore 
that question 1 and 3 are picking up a different latent factor than question 2, 4 and 5. Question 1 
and 3 also correlate significantly and in the expected direction with our time preference dummy 
variable, while questions 2, 4 and 5 do not. The correlations between 1 and 3 and our time 
preference dummy variable are respectively 0.119 (p=0.000) and 0.056 (p=0.000). The 
correlation with question 4 is unexpectedly negative -0.027 (p=0.003) and the correlations with 
questions 2 (p=0.667) and 5 (p=0.914) are insignificant.  
In the robustness analysis in the main text, we use the principal component of all five 
questions. If we instead run regressions of all outcomes on each question separately, questions 1 
and 3 have remarkably similar signs and significance levels as compared to our (dummy) time 
preference variable. Out of the 19 outcomes we consider in our analyses, question 1 always has 
the same sign and (always a higher) significance level as our dummy variable. Question 3 has 
15 times the same sign and significance level. 
 
